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This paper explores the implications of investors’ everyday mild feelings for aggregate
asset returns. To this end, it introduces a novel class of state dependent preferences
- happiness maintenance preferences - into the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985)
economy by allowing investors’ coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to depend partly
on their current feelings, which, in turn, are a function of the current state of the
economy. Consistent with recent evidence from experimental psychology (see for
example Isen (1999)), good times bring about a positive mood for investors and a
heightened pain from any potential loss. In an attempt to maintain their good mood,
investors become less willing to bear any portfolio risk, i.e. they become more risk
averse.
Extremely mild procyclical changes (a standard deviation of about one percentage
point) in investors’ risk aversion are suﬃcient to bring the implications of a simple
dynamic model of asset pricing in line with the historically observed stylized features
of asset returns, without relying on unreasonable values of the behavioral parameters.
With a realistic consumption process, the model is capable of accounting for a sizable
equity premium in line with the one observed in the US data. It also performs
well with respect to other ﬁnancial statistics, such as the average risk-free rate, the
volatility and predictability of stock returns and the Sharpe ratio. Being able to
match the equity premium, it implies that aggregate ﬂuctuations have important
welfare costs.
Keywords: state dependent utility, aﬀect and decision making, equity premium
puzzle.
JEL Codes: D81, D91, E44, G12.”Every man is a suﬀering-machine and a happiness-machine combined. The two functions work together harmo-
niously, with a ﬁne and delicate precision, on the give-and-take principle. For every happiness turned out in the one
department, the other stands ready to modify it with a sorrow or pain” (Mark Twain, The Mysterious Stranger)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The relationship between emotions and individual behavior is a central theme of mod-
ern psychology. A large body of experimental evidence as well as simple introspection
support the view that emotions color the way we go about our everyday decisions in
many important respects. For instance, it is widely recognized that ”gut feelings”
experienced at the moment of making a decision, such as worry, fear, dread, anxiety,
and hope, to name a few, can play a critical role in the choice one eventually makes.
Economists have been aware of these simple observations at least since Adam Smith1.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of asset pricing models maintain the assumption that
consumers’ valuation of relevant economic variables can be fairly well represented
as a given unemotional (utility) function of the enduring, intrinsic properties of the
physical outcomes. The recent stream of research in behavioral ﬁnance (see Thaler
(1992), Barberis and Thaler (2001) and Shleifer (2000) for extensive surveys) is no
exception2.
There are, of course, good reasons to maintain this assumption. Samuelson (1937)
acknowledges that emotions are among the psychological factors that aﬀect the values
of the behavioral parameters of a model, but, nevertheless, considers a careful study
of such dependence as outside the realm of economics3. The numerous documented
empirical failures of asset pricing models constitute grounds to question, on a purely
pragmatic basis, the ability of the assumption of unemotional consumers to shed
light on the properties of aggregate asset returns. In fact, over the last ﬁfteen years,
empirical studies have extensively documented the failure of traditional consumption-
1”When we are about to act, the eagerness of passion will seldom allow us to consider what we
are doing with the candour of an indiﬀerent person. The violent emotions which at that time agitate
us, discolour our view of things, even when we are endeavouring to place ourselves in the situation of
another, and to regard the objects that interest us in the light in which they will naturally appear
to him...This self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the disorders of human
life.” (Adam Smith, 1759).
2In fact, Hirshleifer (2001), in his detailed survey of the approach to asset pricing based on the
psychology of investors, acknowledges the possibility that feelings may aﬀect people’s perceptions of
and choices with respect to risk, but notices that at present we lack a careful ”analysis of the eﬀects
of currently experienced emotions on current prices.”
3Friedman (1962) perhaps best epitomizes this view: ”The relativity, i.e. nonconstancy, of wants
has a number of important implications...Despite these qualiﬁcations, economic theory proceeds
largely to take wants as ﬁxed. This is primarily a case of division of labor. The economist has little
to say about the formation of wants; this is the province of the psychologist. The economist’s task
is to trace the consequences of any given sets of wants. The legitimacy of and justiﬁcation for this
abstraction must rely ultimately, as with any other abstraction, on the light that is shed and the
power to predict that is yielded by the abstraction”.
1based asset pricing models to account for the historically observed level, variation
and cyclical behavior of asset returns. Two of the most prominent failures that have
been identiﬁed are the so-called equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle.
Regardless of the calibration and for behaviorally realistic individual attitudes toward
risk, this class of models is not able simultaneously to generate risk premia that
correspond to a six per cent annual equity premium discussed in Mehra and Prescott
(1985), match the level of returns, and replicate aggregate ﬂuctuations. But there are
also sound and more substantive reasons to explore the stock market implications of
emotions. Recent advances in experimental psychology have shown that emotions are
not inherently more unpredictable or erratic than cognitive deliberations (Damasio,
1994; Zajonc, 1998) and that they can be experimentally measured in many useful
ways (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2001; Isen, 1999). It is commonplace among ﬁnancial
industry professionals and in the popular press to account for movements in asset
returns in terms of fear or hope or anxiety. Finally, ﬁnancial advisors customarily
use terms such as subjective ”psychological comfort” as a criterion to determine the
composition of individual portfolios.
Motivated by these pragmatic and substantive reasons, I study the eﬀects of in-
vestors’ currently experienced emotions on asset prices. I parsimoniously and selec-
tively incorporate insights from experimental psychology about the determinants and
the eﬀects of this class of emotions into a tractable consumption/saving problem in
order to develop an aﬀect-based theory of asset pricing4. This is a challenging task.
The generality needed to build an asset pricing model is clearly not achieved by any
psychological theory or experiment on emotions. Psychologists are far from under-
standing all the details of the complex constellation of individual emotional states.
Nevertheless, the contention of the present research is that some important pieces
of the puzzle are in place and theory and experiments have accumulated a basis of
knowledge which is solid enough to build interesting generalizations. The model is
necessarily simplistic given that its purpose is to illustrate which type of insights
into asset pricing can be gained by taking seriously the state of the art knowledge
of emotions. The hope is that as further knowledge is developed we will be able to
build more articulated and possibly more realistic asset pricing models.
Based on the hypothesis that feelings form the neural and psychological substrate
of investors’ preferences5, I focus on a special class of aﬀect-dependent preferences,
whose motivation is provided by a well documented stylized feature of emotions ex-
perienced at the moment of decision making, happiness maintenance: investors’ risk
aversion depends partly on their current aﬀective state, which, in turn, is a function
4See Mehra and Sah (2002) for a complementary analysis of the eﬀects of incidental inﬂuences
on the volatility of asset returns.
5This approach is shared by some recent studies, none of which focuses on asset pricing. Loewen-
stein (1996) reviews this related literatures on, and models how, visceral factors such as hunger,
fatigue, sexual desire, moods, emotions, pain and drug cravings aﬀect preferences between diﬀerent
goods in models with no uncertainty.
2of the current state of the economy. In particular, good times bring about a posi-
tive mood for investors and, consistent with the experimental evidence (Isen (1999)
and others), a heightened pain from any potential loss. In an attempt to maintain
their mood, investors become less willing to bear any portfolio risk, i.e. they become
more risk averse. A simple calibration exercise shows that a dynamic model of asset
pricing based on investors’ preferences that display such a happiness maintenance
feature is capable of accounting for a sizable equity premium in line with the one
observed in the US post-war data, and performs well with respect to other ﬁnancial
statistics, such as the Sharpe ratio and the volatility and predictability of equity
returns. Being able to match the equity premium, it implies that aggregate ﬂuctu-
ations have important welfare costs. Mild procyclical changes (a standard deviation
of about one percentage point) in investors’ risk aversion over wealth are suﬃcient
to bring the implications of the model in line with the historically observed ﬁrst two
moments of asset returns. Moreover, the empirical performance of the model obtains
with a realistic consumption process and does not rely on unreasonable values of the
behavioral parameters, such as individual risk aversion and rate of time preference.
According to the hypothesis I pursue, one can usefully conceptualize the historically
observed high equity premium as a ”happiness maintenance” premium, inasmuch as
it has been a reward for both the potential excess riskiness of the actual consumption
stream associated with investing in the stock market and the higher perceived threat
to investors’ psychological well-being when holding equities in their portfolios. In this
sense, immediate emotions, by increasing the perceived risk associated with equity,
can contribute to resolving some of the more prominent asset pricing puzzles.
Related literature This work is related not only to various strands of the
equilibrium asset pricing literature but also to recent studies of emotions within the
literature on psychology and economics.
The consumption-based asset pricing literature on the equity premium puzzle is
vast and is beyond the scope of this work to survey (see, rather, Campbell (1999) or
Kocherlakota (1996)). My exercise is close in spirit to the generalizations of either the
time or the state-separability assumption of Von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
pursued in the literature, respectively, by introducing habit formation preferences
(Sundaresan (1989), Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999)) or risk-
sensitivity and precautionary motives (Tallarini (2000), Hansen, Sargent and Wang
(2002)). In particular, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) show that a speciﬁcation of
state-dependent preferences motivated by habit-persistence enjoys some success in
matching the main asset pricing facts, yet does not appear to provide a fully sat-
isfactory solution to the equity premium puzzle since it still requires unrealistically
high and strongly countercyclical eﬀective risk aversion on the part of individuals
to account for the size of the historically observed equity premia. Melino and Yang
(2003) use state-dependent recursive preferences to show that modest variation in the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution improves the asset pricing performance of a
3habit-like model with strongly countercyclical eﬀective risk aversion. Danthine et al.
(2003) and Gordon and St-Amour (2000) also study the asset pricing implications
of state-dependent preferences over consumption only. Danthine et al. (2003) stress
the non-stationarity of the implied pricing kernel as a limiting aspect of this class
of preferences. To bypass this problem, Gordon and St-Amour (2000) introduce an
ad hoc normalization parameter they estimate from the data. Once so normalized,
their pricing-kernel still needs a strongly countercyclical risk aversion to ﬁta s s e t
markets data. Finally, in Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) a strongly counter-
cyclical loss aversion provides an at least partial resolution of the equity premium
puzzle. Happiness-maintenance preferences share with these models the focus on
state-dependent risk aversion. Yet, in sharp contrast to other speciﬁcations of state-
dependent preferences, they imply a stationary pricing kernel and rely on a low and
mildly procyclical risk aversion as the key force behind their ability to account for
asset market facts.
Zou (1994) and Bakshi and Chen (1996) study preferences based on an interpre-
tation of Max Weber’s spirit of capitalism as the pursuit of wealth for its own sake.
As in happiness maintenance, wealth enters the utility function directly. Bakshi and
Chen (1996) ﬁnd that if investors derive a direct enjoyment from wealth, the observed
volatility of wealth is a risk factor for stock returns. However, this provides only a par-
tially satisfactory resolution of the equity premium puzzle (Campbell (1993, 1999)):
if consumption is smooth and wealth is volatile, this itself is a puzzle that must be
explained, not an exogenous fact that can be used to resolve other puzzles. The
present work complements these previous (partial equilibrium) wealth-based models
by providing a mechanism to account for the observed volatility of wealth endoge-
nously within a general equilibrium context that takes explicitly into account the
restrictions imposed on wealth by the budget constraint of investors. Moreover, a
novel feature of happiness maintenance preferences is that wealth levels (relative to
consumption) are an extra source of risk associated with stock holding.
Saunders (1993), Hirshleifer and Shumway (2001), Kamstra, Kramer and Levi
(2001), Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2000) document an empirical relationship be-
tween events such as weather or length of the day and asset returns and interpret it
as suggestive evidence of an impact of a special class of emotions, moods, on asset
prices. Mehra and Sah (2001) formally explore such a relationship within an equi-
librium asset pricing model. They consider the potential eﬀects of moods, i.e. small
ﬂuctuations in investors’ subjective preferences (discount factors and attitudes to-
wards risk) on the volatility of equity prices. They ﬁnd that such ﬂuctuations may
have signiﬁcant implications for understanding the volatility of the prices of ﬁnancial
assets. More direct evidence of an emotional reaction of investors to risk is provided
in Lo and Repin (2001) who study the psychophysiology of risk processing of a sam-
ple of stock market traders and ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlation between changes in the
traders’ cardiovascular variables and market volatility.
Caplin and Leahy (2001), Laibson (2001), Koszegi (2002), and Bernheim and
4Rangel (2002) develop decision theoretic frameworks which explicitly incorporate
emotions. Both the class of emotions studied here and the focus on asset pricing
distinguish the present work from these studies.
Outline of the paper The ﬁrst section motivates the aﬀect-maintenance hy-
pothesis through a selective survey of the ﬁndings of experimental psychologists. It
then develops a formal representation of individual preferences that is broadly con-
sistent with the experimental evidence. It further shows that happiness maintenance
preferences are general enough to be derived from an intuitive set of axioms yet par-
simonious enough to be embedded into a standard equilibrium asset pricing model
along the lines of Mehra and Prescott (1985). The second section characterizes equi-
librium returns in an economy populated by investors with happiness-maintenance
preferences and builds intuition on the relationship between the implied excess re-
turn on equities over bonds and the features of investors’ hedonic risk aversion. A
proof of equilibrium existence and a simple calibration exercise are the core of the
third section, which investigates the quantitative asset pricing implications of aﬀect-
maintenance. The fourth section concludes. Algebraic derivations and proofs are
conﬁned to the Appendix A.
2A n a ﬀect-based capital asset pricing model
Immediate emotions6 are experienced at the time of decision making and arise from
factors related to the decision at hand, including the individual’s environment. The
term aﬀect is used to deﬁne this broad class of emotional states, of which background
moods, happiness or sadness7 are perhaps the most prominent exemplars. Recent
decision making research has seen an increased interest in the role of aﬀect: a grow-
ing body of studies demonstrates that aﬀect is a strong conditioner of individual
preferences and indicates that mild aﬀective states can markedly inﬂuence everyday
thought processes (Loewenstein et al. (2001), Slovic et al. (2002)). It is worth em-
phasizing that such mild everyday aﬀective states are more frequent and relatively
less intense than visceral states, i.e. strong and infrequent ”negative emotions (e.g.,
anger, fear), drive states (e.g.,hunger, thirst, sexual desire), and feeling states (e.g.,
pain) that grab people’s attention and motivate them to engage in speciﬁcb e h a v -
6Anticipated (or expected) emotions are, instead, typically not experienced in the immediate
present, but expected to be experienced in the future. They consist of predictions about the emo-
tional consequences of decision outcomes. A thorough analysis of emotions and decison making is
well beyond the scope of the present work (Loewenstein and Lerner (2001) is an up to date review;
Loewenstein (2000) surveys the ﬁeld with special reference to economics). Eisenberg et al (1996)
ﬁnd that anxiety, a typical anticipatory emotion, correlates with risk aversion.
7It may also be viewed as a quality (e.g. goodness or badness) associated with a stimulus.
Finucane et al. (2002) stress the tendence of these two conceptions to be related, so that I will use
the term intercheangeably.
5iors” (Loewenstein, 2000). Experiments have uncovered many regularities of how
diﬀerent aﬀective states shape individual risk preferences and impact choices under
uncertainty. Broadly speaking, aﬀect has been recognized to do so by changing proba-
bility assessments (e.g., Johnson and Tversky (1983)) and valuation of outcomes (e.g.
Isen and Patrick (1983)). A series of studies (see Isen (1999) for a thorough review)
documents that individuals in diﬀerent emotional states display diﬀerent willingness
to gamble. In particular, a stylized fact is that people who feel good are more risk
averse than people who feel neutral, in particular when the stakes are high. The idea
is that people have a motive for positive aﬀect maintenance: people who feel good
risk losing that state, as well as any tangible stake, if they lose a gamble, since losing
might undermine their good mood. Therefore, with more to lose than controls, they
are more risk averse than controls. Interestingly enough, this choice pattern has been
observed notwithstanding a general tendency of individuals in a positive aﬀective
state to make optimistic probability assessments.
For example, Isen and Patrick (1983) conducted an experiment to study the in-
ﬂuence of positive aﬀect on choices under uncertainty. Participants, a large sample
of college students, were randomly assigned to two groups: positive aﬀect was in-
d u c e do n l yi np a r t i c i p a n t si no n eg r o u pb yr e c e i p to fas m a l lg i f t ,aM c D o n a l d ’ sg i f t
certiﬁcate worth $.50. Subjects were given ten poker chips and told that these chips
represented their credit for participating in the study. Risk preferences were measured
in terms of the amount of chips actually bet by the two groups of participants in a
game of roulette. They found that individuals in a positive mood bet signiﬁcantly
less than controls on gambles with a meaningful probability of losing (about 20%
chance of winning). In particular, individuals in a neutral state bet on average about
six times as many chips as individuals in a positive mood8.
The ﬁnding that individuals in good mood are more risk averse has been repli-
c a t e dw i t hd i ﬀerent measures of risk preferences. For example, Isen and Geva (1987)
used the level of the probability of winning before accepting a bet of ﬁxed amount
and found again that, when a meaningful amount was at stake, namely their whole
endowment of chips, individuals in a positive mood, in contrast to those in a control
group, set a level for the probability of winning as a cutoﬀ point for accepting a given
gamble on average about 30% higher than controls. Isen et al. (1984) documented
that individuals in whom a positive mood had been induced by receipt of a small
gift expressed greater preference in a lottery choice for a $1 ticket rather than a $10
ticket relative to a control group. Nygren et al. (1996) provided stronger support
for an inﬂuence of aﬀect on risk taking: they asked participants in whom positive
aﬀect had been induced, as well as no manipulation controls, to make actual betting
decisions in twelve diﬀerent three-outcome gambles. The mean bet value of aﬀect
condition participants was found to be consistently lower of about 30% than controls,
regardless of the riskiness of the gambles, i.e. the ratio of the probability of winning
and loosing or of the amounts.
8The latter bet on average only about half chip!
6While these early results indicated a tendency toward conservatism in risk prefer-
ences, Isen et al. (1988) focused more directly on the notion of risk aversion typically
employed in economics and ﬁnance. They examined the slope of the utility associated
with various outcomes, as a function of positive aﬀect induced by means of a small
bag of candy. Both control and aﬀect condition participants were asked to make
choices between pairs of simple 50-50 gambles in such a way that a set of indiﬀerence
points could be found and individual utility functions constructed. The average util-
ity curves were computed for the two groups and people in whom positive aﬀect had
been induced displayed a steeper utility function than controls. Fong and McCabe
(1999) replicate the essence of these ﬁndings within a very careful experimental setup
that through the adoption of auction theoretic techniques (see Kagel (1995)) enables
them to avoid potential diﬃculties with the studies mentioned so far, especially asso-
ciated with the possible role of uncontrolled variables, the lack of monetary incentives
and the lack of mechanism to ensure that truthful revelation of private values of the
lottery was a dominant strategy. They endowed their subjects with lottery tickets
and let them bid for the tickets in both a sealed-bid and an English auction. Subjects
could earn up to $10 in each lottery or as little as zero in each. They found that
average exit price is signiﬁcantly lower for subjects whose mood had been improved
by a minor manipulation, indicated a higher risk aversion in aﬀect subjects.
The perspective suggested by these ﬁndings is well described by the idiom: don’t
push your luck. It is worth contrasting it with the ﬁndings of illusion of control or
”gambling with the house money” of Thaler and Johnson (1990), which motivate the
work of Barberis et al. (2001). As suggested in Arkes et al. (1988), the presence
of a meaningful loss might be the crucial determinant of the discrepancy between
the ﬁndings of the two classes of experiments. In one experiment, where a mean-
ingful loss was nonexistent, aﬀect participants exhibited relatively more risk-prone
behavior compared to controls. In a second experiment dealing with insurance buy-
ing behavior where participants were forced to focus on potential loss, positive aﬀect
participants displayed a greater risk aversion than did controls. Nygren et al. (1996)
further illustrates this point: positive aﬀect participants signiﬁcantly overestimated
the probability of winning while participants in the control group did not, in accord
with the ﬁndings of studies such as Johnson and Tversky (1983). Nevertheless, in ac-
tual gambling situations, aﬀect condition participants were much less likely to gamble
than were controls.
2.1 Setup
Aﬀect maintenance preferences are introduced in an otherwise standard ”endowment
economy” (Lucas (1978), Mehra and Prescott (1985)), populated by a large number
of inﬁnitely-lived investors, who are identical with respect to their preferences, en-
dowments and expectations. Given these assumptions, it is customary to aggregate
the investors into a single ”stand-in”, representative agent who each period is faced
7with a consumption/saving problem. There is only one consumption good. The only
source of income in the economy is a large number of identical and inﬁnitely-lived
fruit trees, each in ﬁxed supply. Without loss of generality, the supply of trees is
normalized to unity and it is assumed that there exists one tree per individual, so
that the amount of fruit produced by a tree in period t, denoted yt,r e p r e s e n t st h e
output or dividend per capita. Fruits are non-storable, cannot be used to increase the
number of trees and can only be used for consumption. They are uncertain and evolve
according to yt+1 = xt+1yt,w h e r ext+1 ∈ {λ1, ... , λn} is the growth rate of output
which follows a given stationary stochastic process to be detailed on later. Each tree
has a single perfectly divisible equity claim outstanding on it. In each period there is
a spot market for the consumption good and a ﬁnancial market in which equity shares
are exchanged at a price pt. Consequently, the gross rate of return on equity holdings
from period t to period t +1i sd e ﬁned as Rt+1 =
pt+1+dt+1
pt . A one-period risk-free
asset in zero net supply at a price p
f
t completes the description of the ”technology”







Investors’ utility has a hedonic component which depends on the performance of
their portfolios. More precisely, investors derive utility from a composite good, gt,
which includes both current (per-capita) consumption, ct, and current (per-capita)













and β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor, E0 [·] is the expectations operator
conditional on the information available at time zero, and α>0h a st h ec o n v e n t i o n a l
interpretation of the parameter of relative risk aversion. Notice that u(·)i sc h o s e n
to be iso-elastic to facilitate comparison with previous studies and, perhaps more
importantly, to insure stationarity of the price/dividend ratio and returns.
The composite good, gt, represents the main departure from standard assump-
tions and much of the remaining part of this section details its key features and its
connection with happiness maintenance. In contrast to standard consumption-based
asset pricing models, investors’ ﬁnancial wealth, wt, enters their preferences directly
over and above the indirect utility of the consumption services it provides9, that is





9Ia mn o tt h eﬁrst to study investors’ preferences that depend directly on their ﬁnancial wealth.
Pigou (1947) elaborated on the notion of amenity utility provided by wealth, in the form of power,
sense of security, and control from having resources. Kurz (1968) develops an optimal growth model
in which the utility function is also sensitive to the per capita capital stock of the economy. Carroll
8The parameter θt ∈ [0,1] controls the (relative) demand for ﬁnancial happiness:
values of θt close to the lower (upper) bound of the [0,1] interval correspond to a low
(high) demand for happiness relatively to consumption. Financial wealth represents
a straightforward measure of ﬁnancial performance. It is introduced directly into the
utility function to capture in a straightforward yet parsimonious way the wide range
of non-consumption related pleasures associated with ownership of ﬁnancial assets,
such as, to name a few, power and social status, but also sense of security and control
from having resources. Throughout the paper, it is assumed that investors value total
ﬁnancial wealth as deﬁned by the value of the beginning-of-period asset holding, st,
and dividends, yt, at the current prices, pt. Formally,
wt =( pt + yt)st
Aﬀect-maintenance preferences are modelled as an instance of state-dependent
preferences10 by postulating a state-dependent demand for ﬁnancial happiness. Ap-
pendix A gives a standard set of axioms and a representation theorem for these
preferences. To develop intuition on the connection between θt and happiness main-














Investors’ expected utility has a decision component, which depends on current
consumption, and a hedonic component, which depends on the performance of their
portfolios. Financial income relative to consumption is assumed to provide a good
ﬁrst approximation indicator of this performance and, hence, a direct source of, at
least ﬁnancial, happiness. This appears to be broadly consistent with an empirically
well established stylized fact of the relationship between individual emotional well-
being and aggregate economic conditions12 (Easterlin (2001), (2000), (1974), (1995);
Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2000); Diener and Oishi (2000)): there is no clear cut trend,
(2000) shows a model with direct utility from wealth might help to explain the high saving rates of
the rich. Carroll (2002) further shows that direct utility from wealth can help understanding why
portfolios of the rich are heavily skewed toward investments in their own privatelyheld businesses.
Z o u( 1 9 9 4 )a n dB a k s h ia n dC h e n( 1 9 9 6 )s t u d yp r e f e r e n c e sb a s e do na ni n t e r p r e t a t i o no fM a xW e b e r ’ s
spirit of capitalism as the pursuit of wealth for its own sake. The loss aversion motive studied in
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) is yet another instance of preferences that depend on changes
in ﬁnancial wealth.
10Laibson (2001) and Loewenstein (2000) take an analogous approach to study the eﬀect of emo-
tions in diﬀerent contexts and with a focus on diﬀerent questions from the ones studies here.
11Notice that the utility function is non-separable in consumption and wealth.
12Methodologies used to assess subjective wellbeing include large-scale national surveys, daily
experience sampling, longitudinal studies, and controlled experiments. These surveys typically ask
questions such as: ”Taking all things together, how would you say things are these dayswould
you say youre very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy these days?” While life satisfaction and
happiness are somewhat diﬀerent concepts, responses are highly correlated and hence these concepts
9positive or negative, in self-reported subjective well-being over periods of 20 to 30
years in rich countries. In particular, in the United States between 1946 and 1991, per
capita real income has risen by a factor of 2.5, but happiness, on average, remained
constant. Empirical research on happiness and the business cycle (Di Tella et al
(2001)) conﬁrms that movements in reported individual well-being display signiﬁcant
correlation with macroeconomic variables such as Gross Domestic Product. This
holds true after controlling for the personal characteristics of respondents, country
ﬁxed-eﬀects, year dummies, and country-speciﬁc time trends. Finally, psychometric
studies13 lends further support to the view that income aﬀects subjective well-being in
a systematic fashion. In fact, a series of studies (perhaps most notably Ehrhardt et al.
(2000) and Larsen and Diener (1985)) ﬁnds that life-satisfaction is stable over time,
with autocorrelations that range in the (.4,.6) interval: even if emotions are found
to ﬂuctuate a great deal over time, when averaged over several months these shifts
reveal that individuals’ mean levels of emotion exhibit a signiﬁcant degree of coherence
and stability over time and across situations which is not attributable to artifact of
self-report measurements. In the context of the present model, where all income





then summarizes the possibly many reasons why
income aﬀects investors’ happiness, other than by providing them future consumption
services, and, by entering directly the utility function, formalizes the intuition that
investors’ utility from consumption depends on their experienced happiness.
One important implication of (1) is that a mean preserving spread of ﬁnancial
wealth (relative to consumption) directly reduces investors’ utility. If ﬁnancial wealth
is a source of happiness, the desire to maintain such happiness should determine
the size of the reduction of investors’ utility. In fact, while investors’ relative risk
aversion over gt gambles, α, is constant, investors’ hedonic risk aversion, at, that is
their risk aversion over portfolio risk, is a simple function of their demand for ﬁnancial
happiness. In fact, by deﬁnition14
at =( α − 1)θt +1∈ (1,α)
As far as α>1 - a restriction maintained throughout the paper - at is increasing
in θt.I nt h i ss e n s e ,f o ra n yg i v e nα, θt determines by how much a mean preserving
spread of ﬁnancial wealth (relative to consumption) reduces investors’ utility. Of
are typically joined under the broader rubric of subjective wellbeing. A host of validation studies
have suggested that these questions reveal something meaningful and can indeed be interpreted
as reﬂecting levels of well-being. For instance, those who report being happier are typically rated
by others as happier, and tend to smile and laugh more. Self-reported happiness also correlates
with both heart rate and electrical activity in the brain. Measures of subjective well-being have
relatively high test-retest correlations, similar microeconometric structure across time and space,
and are highly correlated with related questions. See Frey and Stutzer (2002) for an up to date
survey of the happiness research literature in economics.
13See Diener and Lucas (2000) for a survey of the literature on subjective emotional well-being.
14See Appendix A for details.
10course, given θt, ah i g h e rα translates into a higher hedonic risk aversion. This oﬀers
a particularly parsimonious device to introduce happiness maintenance and preserve,
at the same time, the constancy of relative risk aversion over consumption. Consistent
with the previously described ﬁndings of experimental psychologists (Isen (1999) and
others), the following particularly simple speciﬁcation is chosen:














is the average of the recent n states of the economy and θt is an increasing function of
the state of the economy so that, for any given α, at is higher in good times. This is
broadly consistent with the view that risk aversion is procyclical, that is in good times
investors become more risk averse toward ﬁnancial wealth (relative to consumption)
in an attempt to maintain their happiness. The parameter θ controls average hedonic
risk aversion. Moreover, together with n, it determines the intensity of the happiness
maintenance motive, that is how sensitive investors’ hedonic risk aversion is to changes
in the state of the economy. In fact, with higher values of θ diﬀerences in hedonic
risk aversion across states are more pronounced for any realization of the underlying
states of the economy. The parameter n controls how far back in the past investors
look to determine whether times are good or bad. If n =0( 2 )s i m p l i ﬁes to
θt = θxt = θ
yt
yt−1
In this case good times are measured simply by the current state of the econ-
omy. If n ≥ 1 a mean of the recent past states of the economy measures investors’
hedonic risk aversion. This is broadly consistent with the psychological evidence on
incidental emotions (see Loewenstein et al. (1999) and Gilbert and Wilson (2002) for
a careful review of the experiments) which documents the existence of a durability or
projection eﬀect: individuals exaggerate the degree to which their future moods will
resemble their current or recent past moods. This speciﬁcation can be interpreted
either as a formalization of the case when investors’ current moods are aﬀected by
the recent economic trend or when their views about the current times are formed
by extrapolating from the recent past, a feature often encountered in the accounts of
the popular press.
Under some particular values of θt the model collapses into basic consumption -
based or wealth - based models that have been previously studied in the literature
and hence provide a useful benchmark to gauge the contribution of happiness main-
tenance. In particular, if θt = θ 6=0 , the model reduced to a standard wealth-based
11setup of the type studied, even though in a diﬀerent context, by Bakshi and Chen
(1996) and Epstein and Zin (1989). When θt = θ =0 , the model reduces to the
standard consumption-based asset pricing framework.

















and θt is deﬁn e di n( 2 ) . Notice that U (·) is increasing in both consumption and
wealth and investors are assumed to have rational expectations on the fundamentals
of the economy. The choices of an investor with aﬀect-dependent preferences are
fully characterized by the triple (β,α,θt), i.e., respectively, by his subjective rate of
time preference, β, his relative risk aversion, α, and his relative demand for ﬁnancial
happiness, θt. Variables (yt,x t,θ t)a r es u ﬃcient relative to the entire history of shocks
up to, and including, time t for predicting the subsequent evolution of the economy.
They thus constitute legitimate state variables for the model.
2.2 The consumption-saving problem
The problem of the ”stand-in” investor, viewed in period 0, is, given the asset price
function, pt = p(yt,x t,θt), the initial state of the economy, y0, his initial asset hold-
ings, s0, and his initial aﬀective state θ0 to choose a sequence of plans for consump-
tion, ct, and end-of-period asset holdings, st+1, that maximizes his present discounted
expected utility subject to his budget constraint. Formally, the investor chooses con-







tu(g (ct,w t;θt)) (4)
ct + ptst+1 =( pt + yt)st = wt
ct > 0,s t+1 ∈ (0,1]
s0,y 0 θ0 given
where u(gt)i sd e ﬁn e di n( 3 ).
The functional equation associated with the investor’s maximization problem is:
V (st,y t,θ t)= m a x
{ct,st+1}
{u(g (ct,w t;θt)) + βEtV (st+1,y t+1,θ t+1)} (5)
ct + ptst+1 =( pt + yt)st = wt




xtdF (yt+1,x t+1;yt,x t) is the expectation operator. The ﬁrst order
and envelope conditions are respectively:
u1 (g ((pt + yt)st − ptst+1,(pt + yt)st;θt))pt = βEtV1 (st+1,y t+1,θt+1)
and
V1 (st,y t,θ t)=u1 (g ((pt + yt)st − ptst+1,(pt + yt)st;θt))(pt + yt)
+u2 (g ((pt + yt)st − ptst+1,(pt + yt)st;θt))(pt + yt)
where u1 and u2 denote the partial derivative of the utility function with respect to
consumption and wealth respectively. Consequently, simple algebraic manipulations
deliver15 the following Euler equation:
u1 (g (ct,w t;θt))pt (6)
= βEt [(u1 (g (ct+1,w t+1;θt+1)) + u2 (g(ct+1,w t+1;θt+1)))(pt+1 + yt+1)]
This is the fundamental equation for the pricing of capital assets. It equates the
loss in utility associated with respectively postponing consumption from today to to-
morrow and carrying one additional unit of capital to the discounted expected utility
of the resulting additional consumption next period. The intuition for it is common
to a broad class of wealth-based asset pricing models: by reducing consumption by pt
units in the ﬁrst period, the agent can purchase one unit of the asset, thereby raising
consumption by st+1 units in the second period. This consumption/saving decision,
however, entails a portfolio adjustment which has a direct eﬀect on investor’s utility
as indicated by the second term on the right-hand side of equation (6). The dis-
tinctive feature of the aﬀect maintenance model is that the extent to which a given
portfolio adjustment is expected to change investors’ utility depends on how the (ex-
pected) future state of the economy aﬀects investors’ hedonic risk aversion through
its dependence on θt+1. Moreover, investors fully anticipate changes in their hedonic
risk aversion and, consequently, can fully hedge this extra source of uncertainty.
The Euler equation is derived using only the preferences and the budget constraint
of the investor. Before exploiting the restrictions imposed by equilibrium on asset
returns, it is useful to consider the consequences of the individual budget constraint
and preferences for asset returns. Given the preferences speciﬁed in (3), the risk-free













































where at =( α − 1)θt+1 is the hedonic risk aversion. Two parametric choices provide
a useful benchmark to gauge the contribution of happiness maintenance to the de-
termination of expected returns. In particular, when θt = θt+1 = θ =0 , the risk-free
rate reduces to the one predicted by the standard consumption-based asset pricing








In analogy with (8), under aﬀect-maintenance preferences the risk-free rate is
ceteris paribus high when the investor is impatient, i.e. when he has a low rate of
time preference, β, when he has a high consumption smoothing preference, that is
when his coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, α, is high, and when consumption growth




















. Aﬀect maintenance, in analogy with standard wealth-
based asset-pricing models, adds wealth growth as a determinant of returns. One
can then think of the way wealth ﬂuctuations contribute to the determination of
the risk-free rate in analogy with the way consumption changes do in a traditional
consumption-based model. However, given consumption and wealth growth, there
is a ﬁrst sense in which aﬀect maintenance contributes to lower the risk-free rate:
if investors derive direct utility from their portfolio wealth, then, relative to the
case of Mehra and Prescott (1985), they will attempt to reduce current consumption
and increase current saving. The attempt to increase current saving puts downward
pressure on the real interest rate, as indicated by the third term in (7).
Relative to these polar cases, the risk-free rate under aﬀect-maintenance prefer-
ences has one distinctive feature: there is an added source of uncertainty or volatility
due to the fact that now risk-aversion itself changes. This aﬀects the risk-free rate
in two ways: since investors are uncertain about how much marginal utility they will
derive tomorrow from any extra unit of portfolio wealth, there is an increase in per-
ceived risk from the third term in (7) which leads them to seek safety in the risk-free
14asset, driving its price up or, equivalently, its return down. Moreover, not just wealth
changes, but the level of their future wealth (relative to consumption) itself becomes
a crucial determinant of the risk-free rate. In fact, the last term in (7) indicates
that for a given expected level of wealth (relative to their consumption) tomorrow,
aﬀect-maintenance adds an important component of uncertainty as at+1−at changes
stochastically with changes in the state of the economy. This creates a further motive
for investors to smooth their consumption. If they are frustrated in their attempts
to do so, this increase in perceived risk leads them to seek safety in the risk-free
asset, hence bidding its price up and lowering its return. Importantly, this higher


































where at =( α − 1)θt + 1 is the hedonic risk aversion. Given the speciﬁcation of
the investor’s preferences, it is straightforward16 to observe that the (conditional)
expected premium demanded by the investor to hold his wealth in equities, EΠ =





































The expected premium, as stated in (10), depends upon the covariation of the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the return on equities, as customarily
implied by consumption-based asset pricing models. This covariability is what results
in risk. Contrary to standard consumption-based asset pricing models, if investors
were risk neutral, i.e. if α =0 , the covariance term would not be zero. In other
words, an investor who is indiﬀerent to consumption variations per se but has aﬀect-
maintenance preferences would still require a premium to hold equities. In this sense,
aﬀect maintenance adds two crucial determinants of the expected rate of return on
16See Appendix A for the algebraic derivations.
15equities and, consequently, of the expected premium: since investors are uncertain
about how much marginal utility they will derive tomorrow from any extra unit of
portfolio wealth, there is an increase in perceived risk from the third term in (10).
Moreover, under aﬀect maintenance wealth risk which characterizes standard wealth-
based asset pricing model gains an extra term: not just wealth changes, but the level
of their future wealth (relative to consumption) itself becomes a crucial determinant
of the premium. In fact, the last term in (10) indicates that for a given expected
level of wealth (relative to their consumption) tomorrow, aﬀect maintenance adds an
important component of uncertainty as at+1 −at changes stochastically with changes
in the state of the economy. This creates a further motive for investors to smooth
their consumption. If they are frustrated in their attempts to do so, this increase
in perceived risk leads them to require a higher return on risky assets for any given
level of consumption and wealth risk. It is worth stressing that the (expected) future
level of the ratio of consumption to wealth is bounded below one even in a growing
economy, since the budget constraint of the investor holds. In contrast to previous
models with state-dependent preferences such as Danthine et al. (2003) and Gordon
and St-Amour (2000), this implication of happiness maintenance preferences enables
the model to rely on a ”level” eﬀect as an extra source of risk while retaining the
stationarity of returns.
3 Aggregate asset pricing implications of happi-
ness maintenance
To what extent can the most prominent asset pricing puzzles, namely the ”risk-
free rate” and ”equity premium” puzzles, be resolved by the introduction of aﬀect-
maintenance preferences? More generally, can aﬀect maintenance contribute to build-
ing a satisfactory analytical account of the main stylized facts of ﬁnancial markets?
To address this questions it is necessary to characterize equilibrium asset prices and
returns in an economy populated by investors with preferences deﬁned as in (3). Given
the ﬁxed supplies of goods and assets, the determination of the quantity choices in a
competitive equilibrium in this economy is trivial: all fruits are consumed during the
period in which they are produced, i.e., ct = yt,w h e r ect is the per-capita consump-
tion in period t, and the representative investor willingly holds all his wealth in the
risky asset, st = st+1 = 1. Since consumer-investors are assumed to have identical
preferences, per-capita consumption of the representative investor equals aggregate
consumption, which then equals aggregate output. Equilibrium, then, is character-
ized by the asset price function that supports this allocation, that is by the function
pt = p(yt,x t,h t)t h a ts o l v e s
u1 (g (yt,p t + yt;θt))pt
= βEt [(u1 (g (yt+1,p t+1 + yt+1;θt+1)) + u2 (g (yt+1,p t+1 + yt+1;θt+1)))(pt+1 + yt+1)]
16Loosely speaking, the optimality conditions that correspond to the solution of
the investor’s problem deﬁn e di n( 4 )a n dt h er e q u i r e m e n to fm a r k e tc l e a r i n gi nt h e
aggregate provide the fundamental equations for pricing the risk-free and risky asset.
Given (3), this equation can be equivalently written17 as




















yt is the price-dividend ratio function. For the probability structure spec-
iﬁed in the next section, Appendix A contains a proof of the existence of equilibrium.
The following proposition oﬀers a characterization of equilibrium asset returns when
investors have aﬀect-maintenance preferences.
Proposition 1 Given the preferences in (3) the equilibrium risk-free interest rate
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Proof. see Appendix A.
Calibrations of equation (12) in the traditional asset-pricing literature typically
use historical data on
ct+1
ct = xt+1 to estimate expected consumption growth. When
these calibrations use conventional values of the preference parameters β and α,t h e
resulting risk-free rate is much higher than its historical average of one or two percent
per year in the United States. This ﬁnding has been dubbed the ”risk-free rate puzzle”
by Weil (1989). Moreover, calibrations of the average equity premium implied by the
analog of equation (13) using conventional values of the preference parameters β and
α typically yield an equity premium that is much smaller than the historical average
equity premium of about 6% per year in the United States. This is in essence the so
called ”equity premium puzzles” (Mehra and Prescott, 1985).
17See Appendix A for the details of the derivation.
173.1 A quantitative assessment
In order to gain ﬁrst insight into the quantitative eﬀect of aﬀect maintenance on
aggregate asset returns, this section presents numerically computed solutions to the
problem of the investor deﬁned in (4) for various parameter choices and uses this
solution to compute the associated time averaged risk-free rate, market rate, and risk
premium as implied by equations (12) and (13). The choice of speciﬁc values of the
behavioral parameters and of the aggregate growth rate of output, xt,i sc r u c i a lf o r
the empirical evaluation of the model.
The ”technology” side of the model is entirely standard. As in Mehra and Prescott
(1985), the aggregate growth of output xt follows a Markov chain and the number of
states n is limited to two (λ1,λ 2),with transition probabilities given by Π and deﬁned
as follows
λ1 =1 + µ + δ (14)
λ2 =1 + µ − δ
Π =
·
π 1 − π
1 − ππ
¸
The parameters µ, δ and π are chosen to match respectively the mean, standard
deviation and ﬁrst order autocorrelation of aggregate consumption growth. More
precisely, as customary in the consumption-based asset pricing literature, the values
of the parameters are chosen to match the historically observed values in the time
series for aggregate consumption in the US economy between 1889 and 1985. The
values required are µ =0 .018,δ=0 .036,π=0 .43.
The remaining parameters (β,α,θt) pertain to investors’ preferences and have all
clear behavioral interpretations and, consequently, can be chosen on the ground of
realism in the light of introspection and evidence from ﬁeld studies. Before presenting
the main ﬁndings, it is then important to discuss the criteria that enlighten these
choices since, to a large extent, the puzzling nature of the implications of traditional-
asset pricing models is a matter of tastes, in the sense that the stand one takes on it
depends crucially on ones views on the reasonableness of given values of preference
parameters.
It is customary to choose a time preference coeﬃcient, β, close to and lower than
o n e .An e g a t i v er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eh a sb e e ns h o w nt ob ee ﬀective in ”solving”
the ”risk-free rate puzzle”, but introspection provides a strong argument in support
of a positive rate of time preference. Consequently, β is chosen to be equal to .99.
Ever since Mehra and Prescott (1985) most discussions of the asset pricing puz-
zles deem as reasonable risk aversion coeﬃcients within the (0,10) interval. Casual
introspection, ﬁeld studies and experiments provide compelling support to a risk aver-
sion coeﬃcient lower than 10, given that an α beyond 10 would imply rejections of
consumption (and wealth) bets that most investors and in fact most subjects in ex-
18periments do not turn down18.A r i s k a v e r s i o n c o e ﬃcient close to the lower bound
of the interval (0,10) is particularly important from the perspective of the present
work, since the many documented asset pricing puzzles suggest the need of exploring
analytical avenues that can account for the observed stylized facts of asset markets
without resorting to high values of risk aversion. Given that α>1 is needed to insure
consistency between the chosen speciﬁcation of θt and happiness maintenance, α is
taken to be equal to 3, a relatively low value which does not violate this restriction.
Moreover, a comparative dynamics exercise is undertaken for values of risk aversion
within the (2,10) interval.
Given these parametric choices, the calibration exercise consists in asking whether
there are behaviorally reasonable parametrizations of happiness demand, θt, under
which the model delivers a satisfactory asset pricing performance. Given the simple
speciﬁcation chosen for θt in (2), addressing this questions requires determining which
ranges of the two happiness demand parameters, θ and n, are reasonable given the
assumptions on the aggregate growth of output xt. Recall that for the composite good
gt to be well deﬁned θt has to lie at every point of time within the [0,1] interval. This





, for every t. Psychological
experiments do not provide ﬁrm ground to further restrict the choice of θ within this
interval. Moreover, introspection seems to provide limited guidance as well. The focus
of the present study on asset pricing, rather than on the demand for happiness per
se, suggests to take a pragmatic stand on this question. Consequently, the following
interval is considered: [0,0.5]. This interval is conservative since it does not allow the
demand for consumption to be relatively higher than that for happiness. Moreover, it
has the advantage of constraining hedonic risk aversion to be always lower than α and
less volatile than the underlying state of the economy. In fact, recall that investors’
hedonic risk aversion, given the chosen α =3 , is simply
at =2 θt +1=2 θxt (n)+1
and its standard deviation is
σ (at)=σ (θt)=2 θσ(xt (n)) ≤ 2θδ
Given the mean and standard deviation of aggregate consumption growth, θt ∈
[0,0.5] implies at ∈ (1,2) and σ(at) ∈ (0,0.036). This parametric choice appears to
be broadly consistent with the emphasis of happiness maintenance experiments on
mild everyday emotions, which, in the current context, are measured by a low and
mildly volatile hedonic risk aversion. Finally, given that the model is calibrated on
yearly frequency, it is intuitive to constrain n within the [0,5] interval so as to roughly
18A noptable exception is Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), who have argued that there is no
compelling reason to restrict the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to be less than ten, as the
results of such experiments are very sensitive to details of their speciﬁcation, including particularly
the size of the gamble one considers.
19cover the average length of a business cycle. In this way, investors span at most an
entire cycle in their assessment of the recent trend of economic conditions. Table 1
contains a summary of the parameter values .
An often heard source of criticism of preference-based accounts of stock market
facts (see Zin (2001) for a recent forceful restatement) blames them for deviating from
the discipline of structural modelling and possibly obtaining spurious results due to
the extra degrees of freedom the modeler enjoys by adding free behavioral param-
eters. Zin (2001) suggests using non-sample-based criteria to determine whether a
given preference structure is reasonable. The clear behavioral interpretation of θt and
the tight mapping between its stochastic properties and those of hedonic risk aversion
can be considered as non-sample-based criteria to discriminate between alternative
parametric choices of happiness demand. In this respect, the spirit of the present
calibration exercise can be usefully contrasted with two of the most prominent ex-
isting preference-based accounts of stock market facts, namely habit-persistence and
prospect theory inasmuch as neither the θt process is forced to match any of the
stochastic properties of returns as Campbell and Cochrane (1999)’s habit process is,
nor its speciﬁcation allows for a relatively large number of parameters whose reason-
ableness is problematic to gauge outside the data matching exercise as in Barberis et
al. (2001).
Computing returns Expected returns cannot be solved for in closed form and
need to be computed using numerical methods. As in Mehra and Prescott (1985),
the deﬁnition of returns can be used to rewrite equation (13) in terms of the price-
dividend ratio. Generally speaking, if the pricing kernel does not depend upon the
level of consumption (as here), we would not expect asset prices to depend on the
levels either. Thus it is natural to assume that the price of equities is pe(ct,λ i,θ i)
= fict, where fi =
pe(ct,λi,θi)
ct is a price-dividend ratio function related to λi,t h e
growth rate of output, both directly and through the dependence of θt on λi. Under
the assumed probability structure the Euler equation (11) in general deﬁnes a system
of (nonlinear) ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations in unknown price-dividend ratios which
can be solved using numerical methods. With these price relationships it is relatively
straightforward to compute the conditional and unconditional expectation of asset
returns using their deﬁnition19.
The number of ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations and price-dividend ratios deﬁned
by (11) and the methods adopted to actually solve these equations depend on the
value of n. In particular, when n =0 ,θ i = θλi and hence the price-dividend ratio
function depends only on the growth rate of output, that is fi =
pe(ct,λi)
ct .T h eE u l e r
equation (11) in this case deﬁnes a system of two (nonlinear) ﬁrst-order diﬀerence
e q u a t i o n si nt w ou n k n o w np r i c e - d i v i d e n dr a t i o sw h i c hc a nb es o l v e di nc o m p l e t e
analogy with the traditional Mehra and Prescott (1985) methodology. It is clear
19Details on the remaining part of the computation are given in Appendix A.
20then that when n = 0 the model precludes time-variation in expected returns. This
feature is not unintentional, since it highlights an important distinctive feature of
happiness maintenance with respect to other models of state-dependent preferences
such as, for example, habit-persistence: the ability of the model to generate a high
and highly volatile premium does not depend on time-varying expected returns. For
n ∈ [1,5 ]t h ed e p e n d e n c eo fθi on the past realizations of aggregate dividend growth
induces an element of time-variation in expected returns. This feature has a limited
impact on the predicted premium but will be shown to improve the ﬁt of the model
with respect to a broader set of stylized facts of ﬁnancial markets. It also makes the
number of ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations and price-dividend ratios deﬁned by (11)
diﬀerent from the case of n =0s i n c en o wfi =
pe(ct,λi,θi)
ct depends eﬀectively on two
states, λi and θi. This dependence renders the traditional solution methodology of
less straightforward application. To circumvent this diﬃculty, standard simulation
methods are employed to solve (11). In particular, a simple parametrized expectation
algorithm is adopted (see Marcet and Marshall (2002) for a detailed description of
the algorithm) and the solved system is then simulated to generate a long times series
of 50,000 data points to compute summary statistics20.
3.1.1 The risk-free rate, the equity premium and the volatility puzzles
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 displays summary statistics for value-weighted S&P 500
stock market data from 1889 to 1985. This is an updated version of the long sample
used in the seminal contribution of Mehra and Prescott (1985) and since then used as a
classical benchmark to evaluate the empirical performance of asset pricing models. As
already mentioned, the mean excess return of equities over relatively riskless securities
such as bonds, usually referred to as the equity premium, is slightly higher than
six percent, with riskless securities paying an average return of about one percent.
Moreover, riskless securities have displayed a signiﬁcantly lower volatility of returns
than equities with a diﬀerence in the order of ten percentage points. Consequently,
the so called Sharpe ratio, which is deﬁned as the mean of the equity premium divided
by its standard deviation, has been in the neighborhood of .3.
To facilitate comparison, the second column of Table 2 reports the predictions of
the traditional consumption-based asset pricing model - to which the present model
reduces when θt = θt+1 = 0 - under the parameters chosen. This oﬀers a quantitative
counterpart to the previous discussion of asset pricing puzzles: in essence, the pre-
dicted premium is one order of magnitude smaller than the actual one, the risk free
rate is too high and both returns display excessively low volatilities. As a result, the
implied Sharpe ratio is too low.
The third column of Table 2 shows that, contrary to partial equilibrium wisdom
(see Bakshi and Chen (1996) for an example), the predictions of a basic wealth-based
model are virtually indistinguishable from those of the consumption-based model.
20The fortran codes to solve and simulate the model are available upon request from the author.
21In fact, when the latter is generalized to allow for a constant demand for happiness
- a case to which the present model reduces when θt = θt+1 = θ 6=0-a n dt h e
restrictions that the budget constraint poses on the relationship between wealth and
consumption are taken into consideration, the introduction of a demand for wealth
only increases prices hence lowering both returns, but it has virtually no eﬀect on the
premium and on the volatilities of returns. This parallels the arguments articulated
in Campbell (1993, 1999) and lends further support to a classical criticism of wealth-
based models: if consumption is smooth and wealth is volatile, this itself is a puzzle
that must be explained, not an exogenous fact that can be used to resolve other asset
pricing puzzles.
The fourth column of Table 2 contrasts these disappointing results with the pre-
dictions of the aﬀect-maintenance model. Happiness demand is on average equal to
0.25 and, hence, hedonic risk aversion is on average 1.5 and has a standard devia-
tion of about 0.01. The implied premium is more than ten times bigger than either
the wealth-based or the consumption-based benchmarks. Moreover, stock market
volatility ceases to be a puzzle. A low level of risk aversion and a reasonable rate of
time preference can be reconciled with the basic facts of asset markets, i.e. a fairly
stable and low average return on riskless securities and a sizable and fairly volatile
premium of equities over bonds, granted that investors have a reasonably low and
mildly procyclical hedonic risk aversion.
Table 3 is presented to give insight into the way happiness maintenance aﬀects
expected returns. It contrasts the scenario of the long sample of Table 2, that is to
say a combination of relatively low riskless return, high premium and high volatility,
with the post-war scenario of relatively higher riskless return, lower premium and
lower volatilities. A slightly lower and less volatile demand for happiness provides
a possible rationale for this second case since lowering hedonic risk aversion reduces
the wedge between the returns on riskless and risky securities mostly by increasing
the return on riskless securities.
Volatility bounds and the market price of risk To complete the illustration
of the quantitative eﬀects of happiness maintenance on asset returns, it is useful to
consider Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)’s statement of the equity premium puzzle.
The Sharpe ratio for asset i equals the assets risk premium divided by its standard
deviation puts a lower bound on the volatility of the stochastic discount factor. The
logic of Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) implies that the largest possible Sharpe ratio














σ(Ri) is the Sharpe ratio,
σt(mt+1)
Etmt+1 is the market price of risk and mt+1 is
the stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel. The Sharpe ratio is limited by the
22volatility of the stochastic discount factor. In this formulation, the ”equity premium
puzzle” lies in the fact that data on asset market returns and prices imply values of the
market price of risk that are too high to be reconciled with many particular models
of the stochastic discount factor. This is because these theories make the conditional
standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor too small. To see this, Figure
1 plots values of the market prices of risk implied by a traditional consumption-
based asset pricing model with power utility - to which the aﬀect maintenance model
reduces when θt = θt+1 = 0 - under diﬀerent values of the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion. Even with a risk aversion at the upper limit of the plausible interval
(1,10), the market price of risk implied by the model falls short from satisfying the
Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.








































where at =( α − 1)θt + 1 is the hedonic risk aversion.
By simply inspecting this expression, one could conjecture that happiness main-
tenance contributes to increase the conditional volatility of the stochastic discount
factor, since, broadly speaking, they add two sources of volatility: the consump-
tion/wealth ratio, w/c, and hedonic risk aversion, at. Figures 2 to 4 show that, thanks
to these components, for low and moderately procyclical hedonic risk aversion, the
equilibrium stochastic discount factor implied by happiness-maintenance preferences
lies well within Hansen-Jagannathan bounds.
Inspecting the mechanism What drives the asset pricing implications of hap-
piness maintenance? At the outset one might suspect that the somewhat striking
asset pricing implications of the model are the result of hidden unreasonable behav-
ioral assumptions, such as, for example, an equilibrium risk aversion which is much
higher than α or an elasticity of intertemporal substitution which is much lower
than 1
α. Nevertheless, in contrast to other types of state-dependent preferences such
as habit-persistence, the speciﬁcation chosen for aﬀect maintenance highlights the
fact that in equilibrium risk aversion is overall constant and equal to α. Moreover,
while the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is indeed diﬀerent from 1
α and is a
complicated function of the other parameters of the model21, under the benchmark
21Appendix A contains a precise derivation of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
23parametrization of the model it is straightforward to compute and is equal 0.4, hence
well within the range of what is commonly assumed in the consumption-based asset
pricing literature.
Tables 4.1 to 4.3 provide some insight into what might lie beneath the asset pric-
ing performance of the model. In particular, Table 4.1 shows that aﬀect maintenance
shares the intuition of traditional models as to the eﬀects of increasing the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion, α, on the premium. As would be expected, the aggregate
risk premium rises as agents become more risk averse. While qualitatively this is
in complete analogy with what predicted by a traditional model with power util-
ity, the quantitative eﬀect of increasing risk aversion under happiness-maintenance
preferences is remarkably strong.
Further, Table 4.1 shows that increasing hedonic risk aversion decreases the risk-
free rate. This latter fact is easily explained by noting that, greater aﬀective risk
aversion, by causing agents to value a certain wealth unit next period even more
highly, will induce them to be willing to pay even more today for the claim to such
certain wealth. Hence the risk-free rate of return is observed to fall. Noticeably, these
results are robust across a number of happiness modes. Finally, as shown in Table
4.2, the volatility of asset returns increases in a directly proportional fashion with the
volatility of risk aversion.
Table 4.3 shows that hedonic risk aversion is key to the satisfactory empirical
performance of the model. Indeed, as far as the model has a low and mildly procyclical
hedonic risk aversion, with an average in the order of 1.5 and a standard deviation in
the order of 0.01, it can easily generate sizable premia with realistic volatilities. The
message is that there is a wide range of combinations of values of θ and α under which
the model can match the Sharpe ratio, that is under which the model can generate a
sizable and volatile premium of equities over bonds. With a risk aversion as high as
10, an average happiness demand as low as 0.04 is suﬃcient to bring the predicted
equity premium in line with the data. Vice versa, even with a risk aversion as low as
2, there is an acceptable value of average happiness demand for which the model can
deliver a premium which is of an order of magnitude comparable to the one observed
in the data.
3.1.2 Cyclicality of returns and the correlation puzzle
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 reports some salient facts concerning the variations of
asset returns and prices at the business cycle frequencies, namely the fact that the
expected equity premium, conditional volatility and the Sharpe ratio are countercycli-
cal, while the (ex post) price-dividend ratio and the equity premium are procyclical.
Moreover, on average the equity premium is low and negative in bad times and high
and positive in good times. It should come as no surprise that the procyclical risk
aversion characterizing happiness maintenance preferences generates premia and ex-
pected premia (and a Sharpe ratio) that naturally ﬁt the cyclical patterns found
24in the data. Further, it signiﬁcantly attenuates the counterfactual countercyclical
price-dividend ratio implied by the standard consumption-based model.
Perhaps more importantly, the unconditional correlation between stock returns
and consumption growth predicted by the model is well below the almost 1 predicted
by the standard model while still being higher than in the data. In this sense, hap-
piness maintenance alleviates, even though it does not fully resolve, the so called
”correlation puzzle” of Cochrane and Hansen (1992).
3.1.3 Auto-correlations and cross-correlations of returns
Table 6 reports autocorrelations and cross-correlations of returns, excess returns and
of the price-dividend ratio. With respect to the consumption-based benchmark -
whose implications are reported in the ﬁrst column - the most notable change is
that happiness-maintenance preferences, as far as the recent past performance of
the economy contributes to shape investors’ current hedonic risk aversion, bring the
pattern of autocorrelations of the price-dividend ratio in line with the data. Moreover,
returns and the premium become negatively correlated at longer horizons.
Shorter horizon autocorrelations and cross-correlations are roughly comparable to
those of the standard model and constitute perhaps the biggest source of embarrass-
ment for the happiness maintenance model. The simple to the extreme speciﬁcation
of the happiness demand process is certainly fundamental in driving this results and
breaking the perfect positive correlation between θt and the state of the economy xt
postulated when n = 0 would likely improve the ﬁt of the model. Nevertheless, it
would violate the spirit of the calibration exercise which is not meant to force the
model to ﬁt asset market data but rather is an exploration of the potential of behav-
iorally realistic parametrizations of happiness maintenance to account for the stylized
facts of ﬁnancial markets.
3.1.4 Long-horizon predictability
Can the mild changes of hedonic risk aversion induced by happiness maintenance
help the model to reproduce the observed patters of predictability of asset returns?
To answer this question, Table 7 reports the results of regressions of cumulative log
returns over a k-year horizon on lagged price-dividend ratio for k =1 ,2,3,5a n d1 0 .
More precisely, the table reports slope coeﬃcients, βk, and R2
k obtained from running
the following regression from the simulated data
rt+1 + rt+2 + ... + rt+k = αk + βk (pt − dt)+ k,t
where rt is log return. For ease of comparison the corresponding values in the data
and in the standard consumption-based model are reported in the ﬁrst and second
columns of Table 7 respectively. As far as the recent past performance of the economy
contributes to shape investors’ current hedonic risk aversion, the stylized pattern
25documented by Campbell and Shiller (1988) are well replicated by the model: the
coeﬃcients are negative; they start low and then increase. Finally, the R2 increases
with the return horizon.
Table 8 oﬀers an alternative perspective on predictability through the excess
volatility of stock prices. It reports the percentage of the variance of the price-
dividend ratio accounted for by the covariance of the price-dividend ratio with future
returns or by the covariance of the price-dividend ratio with future dividend growth.
The rationale for this exercise is provided by the following approximate decomposition
of the variance of log price-dividend ratio derived in Campbell (1991)








jcov(pt − dt,r t+j)
where ρ =
p/d
1+p/d is deﬁned at the steady state. In the data, both covariances are
negative and a large fraction of total volatility is accounted for by the covariance of the
price-dividend ratio with future returns. To gauge the magnitude of this phenomenon,
consider that, for example, for the 1889-1985 period at a 15 year lag 101 percent of
the total variance of the price-dividend ratio is accounted for by the covariance of
the price-dividend ratio with future returns and only -10 percent is accounted by the
covariance of the price-dividend ratio with future dividend growth. Moreover, it is at
about a 15 years horizon that the forecasts of future returns account for the entire
overall volatility. While the basic consumption-based model is grossly at odds with
these facts, as far as the recent past performance of the economy contributes to shape
investors’ current hedonic risk aversion, the implications of the aﬀect maintenance
model are easy to square with the data.
3.1.5 Long-horizon volatility
Why does the stock market ﬂuctuate? Table 9 investigates whether happiness mainte-
nance has a say about stock market volatility at long horizons and presents the results
of regressions of long-horizon log stock price changes on long-horizon log consumption
changes using simulated data. Barsky and DeLong (1993) study a similar question
and using aggregate stock market data ﬁnd that these regressions yield coeﬃcient
invariably greater than one and as high as 1.61 at a 20-year horizon. Once again, as
the ﬁrst column of Table 9 shows, this ﬁndings are a source of embarrassment for the
traditional-consumption based asset pricing model. Not so for the happiness main-
tenance model which consistently delivers coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly greater than one
and can easily generate coeﬃcients as high as about 6. Finally, at the 20-year hori-
zon the model delivers estimates which are in line with the 1.61 estimate of Barsky
and DeLong (1993). In this sense, mild procyclical changes in hedonic risk aversion
constitute a natural and quantitatively realistic mechanism behind the volatility of
ﬁnancial markets at long horizons.
263.1.6 The welfare costs of aggregate ﬂuctuations
Under happiness maintenance aggregate ﬂuctuations are likely to entail sizable welfare
costs. A simple computation in the spirit of Lucas (1987) illustrates this point. For
purely illustrative purposes, consider perhaps the simplest version of the model when
θt =1 , or equivalently at = a = α and wealth growth is iid lognormal with mean gw











w as the ”certainty equivalent” growth rate of wealth, that is the growth
rate in a non-stochastic economy that gives investors the same level of utility. Then it












With an α =2 ,σ c and gc of the order of one percent annually imply that consumers
would only trade one hundredth of a percentage point of growth for the complete
elimination of ﬂuctuations. By contrast, taking as customary (Cochrane and Hansen
(1992), Epstein and Zin (1991)) the return on the NYSE value-weighted index as a
proxy for
wt+1
wt ,σ w is of the order of twenty percent annually and gw is about seven
percent. Hence, with α = 2 consumer-investors would trade about one half of a
percentage point of growth for the complete elimination of ﬂuctuations, an estimate
that is more than an order of magnitude higher than that indicated by the calculation
of Lucas (1987). This is likely to be a lower bound for estimates one might obtain
from a model with happiness-maintenance preferences, where aggregate ﬂuctuations
change investors’ demand for happiness. Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive
closed forms solutions for the welfare costs of aggregate ﬂuctuations in the full ﬂedged
model with happiness maintenance preferences and one has to resort to numerical
methods to derive empirical estimates. A careful pursuit of this question is somewhat
peripheral with respect to the main focus of the present paper and is left for future
work. For the sake of the present analysis (15) is a simple yet powerful illustration of
the order of magnitude of the discrepancy one is likely to ﬁnd between the estimates
of the costs of aggregate ﬂuctuations in standard consumption-based models and in
models with a demand for happiness.
22Appendix A contains details of the derivation.
273.1.7 Robustness checks
The results collected in Table 10 show that the asset pricing performance of the
happiness maintenance model is robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the happiness
demand process which are consistent with the ﬁnding of psychologists and with the
view that risk aversion is procyclical but not to alternative theories about the inﬂuence
of happiness on risk aversion.
In fact, the second column of Table 10 contrasts the implication of the hap-
piness maintenance model, which are reported for ease of comparison in the ﬁrst
column, with those of a model where happiness demand and hedonic risk aversion
are countercyclical. More precisely, it reports summary statistics of asset returns
when investors’ preferences are deﬁned as in (3) but the happiness demand process
θt is perfectly negatively correlated with consumption growth, rather than positively
correlated as under happiness maintenance. The eﬀects of this departure from the
baseline model are signiﬁcant: the premium shrinks to about a quarter of the value
with procyclical hedonic risk aversion under the same parametrization mostly due to
the fact that the risk-free rate is four times as high.
Nevertheless, the empirical predictions of the model are robust to alternative spec-
iﬁcations that retain the procyclicality of happiness demand and hedonic risk aversion.
For example, as the third column of Table 10 shows, the implied returns the model
would predict if one speciﬁed a separate process for θt are virtually indistinguishable
from those of the benchmark calibration.
4 Conclusion
Drawing on ingredients from outside the usual domain of economic theories of deci-
sion making can help to make some otherwise puzzling features of ﬁnancial markets
more comprehensible. In particular, an equilibrium model simple to the extreme has
been used to show that mild everyday feelings have rich implications for aggregate
asset returns. Happiness maintenance, a well documented feature of the immediate
emotional perception of risk, by increasing the risk associated with equity contributes
to resolve some of the most prominent documented asset pricing puzzles, such as the
risk-free rate, equity premium and volatility puzzles and oﬀers an intuitive rationale
for why business cycles entail nonnegligible welfare costs. Finally, it provides a per-
spective over a broad set of stylized features of ﬁnancial markets, such as, for example,
the predictability of asset returns and the volatility of asset prices at long horizons.
Perhaps most notably, the model does not depart from conventional asset pricing
wisdom along any dimensions other than investors’ preferences and its satisfactory
empirical performance is accomplished in a relatively parsimonious way by adopting
a one-parameter formulation of happiness-maintenance preferences. This formulation
has the additional advantage of lending itself to a straightforward behavioral inter-
pretation, hence oﬀering ﬁrm ground on which to judge the reasonableness of the
28parametric values chosen. In this sense, the results presented are encouraging as they
represent one instance of a viable preference-based account of stock market facts and
show that a deeper understanding of emotions may extend our knowledge of ﬁnancial
markets in many important respects.
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355 Appendix A: derivations and proofs
5.1 Axioms and representation theorems for state-dependent
utility
Technically, the speciﬁcation chosen for the aﬀect-dependent utility belongs to the
wider class of state-dependent utility functions. The structure of the preferences un-
derlying state-dependent utility functions is relatively well understood. Karni (1985)
and more recently Dreze and Rustichini (2001) present a thorough analysis of al-
ternative axiomatizations. I follow Myerson (1991) and give a list of axioms and a
representation theorem for state-dependent preferences of the type informally illus-
trated in the text.
5.1.1 Notation




q : Z → R |
X
y∈Z
q(y)=1a n dq (z) ≥ 0,∀z ∈ Z
)
Let X denote the set of possible prizes that the decision maker could ultimately
get, Ω denote the set of possible states of the world, and assume both X and Ω are
ﬁnite. Deﬁne a lottery to be any function f that speciﬁes a nonnegative real number
f (x | t), for every prize x in X and every state t in Ω, such that
P
x∈X f (x | t)=1
for every t in Ω.
Let L denote the set of all such lotteries. That is,
L = {f : Ω → ∆(X)}
For any state t in Ω and any lottery f in L, f (·|t) denotes the probability
distribution over X designated by f in state t.T h a ti s ,
f (·|t)={f (x | t)}x∈X ∈ ∆(X)
Let Ξ denote the set of all events, S,s ot h a t
Ξ = {S | S ⊆ Ω and S 6= ∅}
For any two lotteries f and g in L and any event S in Ξ, we write f %S g if and
only if (iﬀ) the lottery f would be at least as desirable as g, in the opinion of the
decision-maker, if he knew that the true state of the world was in the set S. In other
words, f %S g iﬀ the decision-maker would be willing to choose the lottery f when
36he has to choose between f and g and he knows only that the event S has occurred.
Given the relation %S,we can deﬁne
f Â Sg iﬀ f %S g and g %S f
f ∼ Sg iﬀ f %S g and g ¿S f
where f ÂS g and f ∼S g have the customary meanings of (conditional) indiﬀerence
and (conditional) strict preference. Naturally, %Ω, ÂΩ and ∼Ωcorrespond to the
familiar %,Â and ∼, that is when no conditioning event is considered, we refer to
prior preferences.
For any number α such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and for any two lotteries f and g in L,
αf +( 1− α)g denotes the lottery in L such that
(αf +( 1− α)g)(x | t)=αf (x | t)+( 1− α)g (x | t)
for all x ∈ X and t ∈ Ω.
Finally, a conditional-probability function on Ω is any function p : Ξ → ∆(Ω)
that speciﬁes nonnegative conditional probabilities p(t | S) for every state t in Ω and
every event S, such that p(t | S)=0i ft/ ∈ S and
P
r∈S p(r | S)=1 .
5.1.2 Axioms
The axioms are to hold for all lotteries e,f,g and h in L,f o ra l le v e n t sS and T in
Ξ, and for all numbers α and β b e t w e e n0a n d1 :
Axiom 2 (Completeness) f %S g or g %S f.
Axiom 3 (Transitivity) If f %S g and g %S h, then f %S h.
Axiom 4 (Relevance) If f (·|t)=g (·|t), ∀t ∈ S, then f ∼S g.
Axiom 5 (Monotonicity) If f ÂS h and 0 ≤ β<α≤ 1, then αf +( 1− α)h ÂS
βf +( 1− β)h.
Axiom 6 (Continuity) If f %S g and g %S h, then there exists some number γ
such that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and g ∼S γf +( 1− γ)h.
Axiom 7 ((Strict) objective substitution) If e(ÂS) %S f and g %S h and 0(<) ≤
α ≤ 1, then αe +( 1− α)g (ÂS) %S αf +( 1− α)h.
Axiom 8 ((Strict) subjective substitution) If f (ÂS) %S g and f %T g and
S ∩ T = ∅, then f (ÂS∪T) %S∪T g.
Axiom 9 (Interest) For every state t in Ω, there exist prizes y and z in X such
that [y] Â{t} [x], where [·] denotes the lottery that always gives the prize for sure.
375.1.3 A representation theorem
A utility function can be any function from X ×Ω into the real numbers, <. A utility
function is state-independent iﬀ there exists some function U : X → <,s u c h t h a t
u(x,t)=U (x), for all x and t.
Theorem 10 The eight axioms are jointly satisﬁed if and only if there exists a utility






u(x,t)=0 ,∀t ∈ Ω;
p(R | T)=p(R | S)p(S | T),
∀R,∀S,∀T : R ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ Ω,S6= ∅;
f % Sg iﬀ Ep [u(f) | S] ≥ Ep [u(g) | S],
∀f,g ∈ L,∀S ∈ Ξ,
where Ep [u(f) | S]=
P
t∈S p(t | S)
P
x∈X u(x,t)f (x | t) is the expected utility value
of the prize determined by f,w h e np(·|S) is the probability distribution for the true
state of the world.
Proof. see Myerson (1991).
5.1.4 Discussion and caveats
Axiom 11 (State neutrality) For any two states r and t in Ω, if f (·|t)=f (·|t)
and g (·|t)=g (·|t) and f %r g, then f %t g.
Theorem 12 Given the axioms above, state neutrality is also satisﬁed if and only if
the conditions of the representation theorem can be satisﬁed with a state-independent
utility function.
Proof. see Myerson (1991).
5.2 Deﬁnition, existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
solution
This Appendix provides a more formal deﬁnition of equilibrium for an exchange
economy populated by investors with preferences deﬁn e da si n( 3 ) .I ta l s oc o n t a i n sa
proof that such equilibrium exists.
5.2.1 Deﬁnition of equilibrium
Equilibrium is deﬁned by a pair of functions, p : <+ → <+, the asset pricing function,
and v(s,y,θ;p), a value function, such that:





, subject to ct +
ptst+1 ≤ st(pt + yt)g i v e nF (·), s0 = b s0 < 1,y 0,θ 0.
2. st+1 = st =1 ,c t = yt.
5.2.2 Existence of equilibrium
This section proves the existence of a (bounded and strictly positive) equilibrium
price-dividend function for probability structure (14). The main complication in es-
tablishing existence derives from the endogeneity of the pricing kernel induced by
the dependence of the utility function on wealth and, in equilibrium, on the price-
dividend function. Such endogeneity prevents us from characterizing the Euler equa-
tion as a non-linear counterpart of the linear Fredholm equations much studied in the
consumption-based asset pricing tradition.
Under the assumed probability structure, the Euler equation (11) deﬁnes the
following system of two non-linear equations in two unknown price-dividend ratio
functions:



























 =0 ( 1 6 )



































π 1 − π
1 − ππ
¸
To simplify notation, we notice that (16) can be rewritten as
























































1 (x1 + γ1)+π12λ
1−α





























1 (x1 + γ1)+( 1− π11)λ
1−α






















2 (x2 + γ2)
¸
− 1=0







where x ≡ (x1,x 2), φ ≡ (π1,π2),π 1 ≡ (π11,π12),π 2 ≡ (π21,π22).
We resort to a ﬁxed point argument (see Milnor (1997) for a detailed treatment)
to show that a solution to G exists.
It is understood that all parameters other than the probabilities are taken as
given. Let
ζ = {(x,φ) | G(x,φ)=0 } ⊂ R
2 × (∆)
2
We start by proving the following
Lemma 13 ζ is a smooth manifold.
Proof. By perturbing G with respect to π1, we need to show that, for an arbitrarily
ﬁxed open and full Lebesgue set of parameter values (β,λ1,λ 2,α,a), the Jacobian of
the map G with respect to π and x, Dπ,xG, has full rank. To this end we study the




0ˆ α(λ1) − ˆ α(λ2)
¸
where we deﬁne α(λ1) ≡ λ
1−α
1 (x1 + γ1),α (λ2) ≡ λ
1−α







, ˆ α(λ1) ≡
λ
1−α







, ˆ α(λ2) ≡ λ
1−α
2 (x2 + γ2).
Evidently, Dπ,xG is onto if α(λ1) − α(λ2) 6=0(or, equivalently, α(λ1) 6= α(λ2))
and ˆ α(λ1) − ˆ α(λ2) 6=0(or, equivalently, ˆ α(λ1) 6=ˆ α(λ2)). However,
α(λ1)=α(λ2) ⇔ ˆ α(λ1)=ˆ α(λ2)
40Suppose, then, that these equalities hold. (16) simpliﬁes to
x1 = βλ
1−α
1 (x1 + γ1)+1
x2 = βλ
1−α



















We need to verify the existence of an open and full Lebesgue measure set of pa-










When π11 =1and π21 =0( 1 6 )simpliﬁes to
x1 − 1=βλ
1−α



















































































































2 (1 + γ2)
¶a2













It is straightforward to show that ∂H
























1 − λ2 logx
∗
2)
C l e a r l y ,t h e r ee x i s t sa no p e na n df u l lL e b e s g u em e a s u r es e to fp a r a m e t e rv a l u e s
(β,λ1,λ 2,α,a) such that ∂H
∂a 6=0or, equivalently, ζ is a smooth manifold.
Lemma 14 There exists a regular value of the map proj (ζ) → ∆,π ∗ such that
#[proj−1 (π∗)] = odd.




























Clearly, the solution is unique.
Lemma 15 The map proj (ζ) → ∆ is proper, that is proj−1 (π) is compact for each
compact subset of probability.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that 1 <p r o j −1 (π) < ∞.





1 (1 + γ1)+( 1− π11)λ
1−α







which is obviously impossible.
Suppose, by contradiction, that ∃πn → πh such that
° °xh° ° ≡
° °x
¡
πh¢° ° →∞ . We

























































































































a2 → K>0, then xh
1 →∞and xh






















































































a2 → 0 is impossible.
We are now in a position to state the following
Theorem 16 There exists a bounded and strictly positive equilibrium price-dividend
function for probability structure (14)
Proof. The statement follows directly from Lemmas 13-15.
5.3 Details of the derivations in the text
5.3.1 Hedonic Relative Risk Aversion
Consider the a-temporal case where the outcome l ∈ L is independent of the prefer-
ence state s ∈ S, with probabilities given by Pl and Ps respectively. It is straight-
forward to derive the hedonic risk aversion of the investor by using the deﬁnition of


























1−α is the state independent utility function,
that is a linear combination with positive weights of conditionally isoelastic concave
functions, and thus concave. Moreover, given that S and L are orthogonal, the
curvature of V (W/Cl) captures the investors’ attitude toward atemporal risk. Hence,
the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion with respect to (wealth relative







































((α − 1)θs +1 )
If preferences are state-independent, i.e. θs = θ ∀s, then the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion is constant and equal to (α − 1)θ+1. The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
for lotteries that are conditional on the realization of a given state s is (α − 1)θs +1.
Since each period is associated with a single preference state, (α − 1)θt +1c a nb e
interpreted as the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for static lotteries.

















ct and gw =
wt+1



































It is straightforward to observe that if we take the term c
w as exogenous and ignore











































Taking logs we have










+l o g( 1+r)



























































5.3.3 Euler equations and returns
Starting from (5), using (3) and substituting for ct into the objective function from
the constraint, we can rewrite the problem as:






+βEtV (st+1,y t+1,θ t+1)
)
ct > 0,s t+1 ∈ (0,1]
s0,y 0,θ 0 given
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to st+1 is
βEtV1 (st+1,y t+1,θ t+1)
=( 1 − θt)[(pt + yt)st − ptst+1]
(1−α)(1−θt)−1 [(pt + yt)st]
(1−α)θt pt
46The envelope with respect to st is
V1 (st,y t,θt)=
(1 − θt)[(pt + yt)st − ptst+1]
(1−α)(1−θt)−1 [(pt + yt)st]
(1−α)θt (pt + yt)
+θt [(pt + yt)st − ptst+1]
(1−α)(1−θt) [(pt + yt)st]
(1−α)θt−1 (pt + yt)
Hence, substituting back for consumption from the budget constraint and using










































Simple algebraic manipulations deliver the Euler equation (9) that appears in the
text.

















































Rf = ERt+1 + Rfcov(mt+1,R t+1)















475.3.4 Computation of returns
























yt to be the price-dividend ratio and observe that in equilibrium we




































































































Hence, the Euler can be rewritten as


















5.3.5 Welfare costs of aggregate ﬂuctuations














































































































w as the ”certainty equivalent” growth rate of wealth, that is the growth


































496 Appendix B: Tables and ﬁgures





µ = E (ct+1/ct) 0.018
δ = σ (ct+1/ct) 0.036
π 0.43
50Table 2 - Summary of unconditional ﬁrst and second moments of returns
in the benchmark calibration
US data No Happiness No HM HM




0.80 5.74 4.64 0.84
E (Re) 6.98 6.22 5.24 6.95




5.44 1.57 2.20 5.55
σ (Re) 19.02 4.87 5.65 23.17
σ (Rep) 18.53 4.60 5.20 22.57
E(Rep)
σ(Rep) 0.33 0.10 0.11 0.27
All statistics are annualized and in percent terms. See Table 1 for a summary of the
parameter values.
Notation: E (·) denotes unconditional expected value, σ(·) denotes unconditional stan-
dard deviation; HM abbreviates Happiness Maintenance.
Data sources: Mehra and Prescott (1985), Campbell (1999). Period: 1889-1985.
Implied hedonic risk aversion: E (at+1)=1 .5; σ (at+1)=0 .009; atmax =1 .52;
atmin =1 .48.
Table 3 - Summary of unconditional ﬁrst and second moments of returns
in the Post-War calibration
US data No Happiness No HM HM




1.68 5.74 4.69 1.56
E (Re) 6.89 6.22 5.28 6.47




2.23 1.57 2.19 5.06
σ (Re) 16.7 4.87 5.63 20.59
σ (Rep) 16.8 4.60 5.18 19.98
E(Rep)
σ(Rep) 0.32 0.10 0.11 0.25
All statistics are annualized and in percent terms. See Table 1 for a summary of the
parameter values.
Notation: E (·) denotes unconditional expected value, σ(·) denotes unconditional stan-
dard deviation; HM abbreviates Happiness Maintenance.
Data sources: Mehra and Prescott (1985), Campbell (1999). Period: 1947-1985.
Implied hedonic risk aversion: E (at+1)=1 .48; σ (at+1)=0 .009; atmax =1 .5;
atmin =1 .46.







































































































































All statistics are annualized and in percent terms.
Parameter values: β =0 .99,n=2 .
Notation: E (·) denotes unconditional expected value, σ(·) denotes unconditional stan-
dard deviation.
Data sources: Mehra and Prescott (1985), Campbell (1999). Period: 1889-1985.




E (Re) E (Rep) σ
¡
Rf¢






































































































All statistics are annualized and in percent terms.
Parameter values: β =0 .99,α=3 .
Notation: E (·) denotes unconditional expected value, σ(·) denotes unconditional stan-
dard deviation.
Data sources: Mehra and Prescott (1985), Campbell (1999). Period: 1889-1985.







US data 0.80 6.18 0.32
α =2 ,θ =0 .42 0.21 4.27 0.23
α =3 ,θ =0 .24 0.84 6.11 0.27
α =4 ,θ =0 .16 2.36 6.12 0.28
α =5 ,θ =0 .12 3.71 6.19 0.30
α =6 ,θ =0 .10 5.05 6.16 0.32
α =7 ,θ =0 .08 6.22 6.23 0.33
α =8 ,θ =0 .06 7.41 6.18 0.35
α =9 ,θ =0 .05 8.44 6.24 0.37
α =1 0 ,θ =0 .04 9.54 6.11 0.39
All statistics are annualized and in percent terms.
Parameter values: β =0 .99,n=2 .
Notation: E (·) denotes unconditional expected value, σ(·) denotes unconditional stan-
dard deviation.
Data sources: Mehra and Prescott (1985), Campbell (1999). Period: 1889-1985.
54Table 5 - Cyclicality
US data No Happiness HM HM HM
θt = θt+1 =0 n =0 n =2 n =5
E (R
ep
L )( −14.63,−11.24) -4.1 -14.2 -12.1 -7.1
E (R
ep
H)( 1 0 .54,13.66) 5.0 20.3 25.0 10.0
Et (Rep) c-cyclical none none c-cyclical c-cyclical
σt (Rep) c-cyclical none none p-cyclical p-cyclical
Rf none 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14
Re
t+1 0.48 0.98 0.80 0.82 0.91
pt/dt p-cyclical -0.15 -0.15 -0.08 -0.09
Et(Rep)
σt(Rep) c-cyclical none none c-cyclical c-cyclical
All statistics are annualized and in percent terms.
Notation: E (·) denotes unconditional expected value, σ(·) denotes unconditional stan-
dard deviation; Et (·) denotes conditional expected value, σt (·) denotes conditional stan-
dard deviation; HM abbreviates Happiness Maintenance.
Data sources: Cecchetti et al. (2000), Campbell (1999). Period: 1889-1985
55Table 6 - Autocorrelations and cross-correlations
US data No Happiness HM HM HM




































































































-0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01
ρ(pt/dt,p t−1/dt−1) 0.78 -0.15 -0.15 0.55 0.63
ρ(pt/dt,p t−2/dt−2) 0.59 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.54
ρ(pt/dt,p t−3/dt−3) 0.54 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.43














-0.12 -0.33 -0.70 -0.42 -0.33
All statistics are annualized and in percent terms.
Notation: ρ(·,·) denotes correlation; HM abbreviates Happiness Maintenance.
Data sources: Campbell (1999). Period: 1889-1985
56Table 7 - Long-horizon predictability
US data No Happiness HM HM HM
θt = θt+1 =0 n =0 n =2 n =5
β1 -1.5 -15.6 -10.2 -6.9 -5.2
β2 -3.0 -15.6 -10.2 -10.8 -6.5
β3 -3.7 -15.7 -10.2 -10.2 -7.7
β5 -6.6 -15.1 -10.1 -10.4 -11.1
β10 -12.1 -14.7 -10.0 -10.2 -10.5
R2
1 4% 7% 43% 28% 13%
R2
2 8% 5% 43% 44% 15%
R2
3 10% 4% 43% 41% 18%
R2
5 19% 3% 41% 42% 25%
R2
10 39% 2% 38% 40% 21%
All statistics are annualized.
Estimated coeﬃcients and R2 in regressions of k-year horizon of log returns on the
lagged log pride-dividend ratio, rt+1 + rt+2 + ... + rt+k = αk + βk (pt − dt)+ k,t.
US data are based on annual NYSE data. Period: 1889-1985. Source: Campbell (1999),
Cecchetti et al. (2000).
Notation: βk denotes 10×coeﬃcient; HM abbreviates Happiness Maintenance.
Parameter values: β =0 .99,α=2 ,θ=0 .24.
57Table 8 - Volatility tests
No Happiness HM HM HM
θt = θt+1 =0 n =0 n =2 n =5
re
t+1 166 114 46 41
∆dt+1 - 5 7 - 3— 1- 4
re
t+5 153 100 99 80
∆dt+5 -59 -3 -1 -3
re
t+10 150 101 98 96
∆dt+10 -56 -3 -1 -2
re
t+15 140 99 96 94
∆dt+15 -48 -2 0 -1
re
t+20 144 101 97 94
∆dt+20 -49 -2 0 0
All statistics are annualized.
Percentage of variance of the (log) price/dividend ratio explained by future (log) equity
returns or (log) dividend growth, that is 100 ×
Pk
j=1 ρjcov(pt − dt,x t+j)/var(pt − dt),
where xt+j is either −re
t+k or ∆dt+k.
Notation: HM abbreviates Happiness Maintenance.
58Table 9 - Long-horizon volatility
No Happiness HM HM HM
θt = θt+1 =0 n =0 n =2 n =5
β1 1.1 6.3 5.3 2.4
β2 1.1 3.7 5.0 2.1
β5 1.0 2.9 4.9 2.0
β10 1.0 2.5 4.5 2.0
β20 1.0 2.2 3.9 1.7
β40 1.0 1.8 2.8 1.4
R2
1 98% 65% 69% 83%
R2
2 98% 43% 65% 80%
R2
5 98% 35% 61% 80%
R2
10 98% 31% 52% 80%
R2
20 98% 31% 40% 75%
R2
40 98% 31% 36% 75%
All statistics are annualized.
Coeﬃcients and R2 in regressions of k-year horizon of the diﬀerence in (log) prices on
the diﬀerence in (log) consumption, pt − pt−k = α + βk (ct − ct−k)+ k,t.
Notation: HM abbreviates Happiness Maintenance.
59Table 10 - Summary of unconditional ﬁrst and second moments of re-
turns under alternative speciﬁcations of the happiness demand process
HM Countercyclical HM





E (Re) 6.95 5.41 6.95





σ (Re) 23.17 13.84 23.17
σ (Rep) 22.57 13.50 22.57
E(Rep)
σ(Rep) 0.27 0.11 0.27
All statistics are annualized and in percent terms. For parameter values see Table 1.
Notation: E (·) denotes unconditional expected value, σ(·) denotes unconditional stan-
dard deviation; HM abbreviates Happiness Maintenance.













Figure 1: The equity premium puzzle, θ =0













Figure 2: Happiness maintenance, θ = .05













Figure 3: Happiness maintenance, θ = .15













Figure 4: Happiness maintenance, θ = .24
64